Conflict and change in Cambodia

Excerpted from
Conflict and Change in Cambodia
Edited with an introduction by Ben Kiernan


Introduction

Eight different regimes have governed Cambodia since 1944. Yet, before World War II, Cambodia was a heavily taxed, relatively quiet corner of the French empire. Its population was 80 percent Khmer, 80 percent Buddhist, and 80 percent rice-growing peasants.

Cambodia also obtained independence under the then-king Norodom Sihanouk, who soon adopted a foreign policy of cold war neutrality. His choice was partly a domestic accommodation, an implicit acknowledgement of the local communists’ important role in the war for Cambodia‘s independence and their potential and incentive to disrupt a more pro western regime. Neutrality was also a foreign policy strategy to keep Cambodia out of escalating conflict in neighboring Vietnam. It worked for over a decade.

Once the United States escalated the Vietnam War in 1964-65, Cambodia had little hope of remaining an oasis of peace. Its frontiers became increasingly porous and vulnerable. By 1966, rampant smuggling of Cambodian rice across the border to both sides of the Vietnam conflict bankrupted the Sihanouk regime by depriving it of export duties, the government’s main source of revenue.

From 1969 to 1973, American aircraft dropped over 2 million tons of bombs on Cambodia’s countryside, killing over 100,000 peasants and driving many survivors into the ranks of the Khmer Rouge.


Chapter 2: Democratization, elite transition, and violence in Cambodia, 1991 – 1999 by David Roberts

Elites and traditional sociopolitical structures: In the Cambodian system, as in many other developing (and developed) states, political leaders exist at the top of the pyramidal structure of relationships, where the wide base supports the narrow elite and the elite rewards the support base. The leaders who rise to the top retain their power by funding the people who put them in power. Equally, those who aspire to elite positions must generate support by paying supporters.

Khmer academic and democracy activist Lao Mong Hay notes that “the Royalist Party got their houses and villas. Whoever got closest to Ranariddh gets [sic] more favors. Strong organization is lacking. They wanted power and then they became drunk with it and neglected the necessary consolidation of their already fragmented and inexperienced party.[1]”

Curtis observes a similar phenomenon with regard to the smaller BLDP. He notes that in their attempts to reward their followers, they mismanaged the sole ministry they had been awarded in the government: “the Secretariat of State of Women’s Affairs, headed by a BLDP member [a man], hires scores of BLDP supporters without regard to qualifications. Many of the new recruits performed no real functions other than filling a party-base position, a sinecure that, while not paying very much, at least provide a regular income, ample opportunity for outside employment, and claim to status.”

The administration, rather than becoming streamlined and more efficient, expanded and stagnated as each department struggled to come to terms with the challenges to its unique authority and as the newcomers struggled to gain a foothold.

In a fragile and vulnerable political system resistance to power-sharing, one side struggled to enter the arena of state management without having a reasonable capacity to absorb the responsibilities attached to the inherent duties.

Jennar observes that this is one of the most striking aspects of Cambodian society: “the protection of a party or clan takes precedence over respect for the law.”

The violence peace: A gradual buildup of tension in that period was caused by the convergence of two problems for Ranariddh and FUNCINPEC. First the CPP had effectively refused to grant positions of authority to Ranariddh’s followers at the grass-root level. Because theoretically more such positions were available in villages and hamlets, communes, and provinces than in Phnom Penh government offices, these location potentially provided a source of reward for the prince’s clients/supporters. However, Hun Sen maintained that many FUNCINPEC members were not equipped to take such positions due to lack of experience or extended absence from the country during the 1980s. This was a reasonable concern.[2]

The second problem is directly linked to this. Ranariddh was losing both power and face. One observer claimed that “Ranariddh…had failed to establish a clear sense of direction”.

Members were disappointed that Ranariddh would not confront the concerns of the party face to face had noted his weakness and this appears to have been a rallying call, underpinned by a mere rhetoric.

Shortly after the congress, senior FUNCINPEC representatives publicly declared that the party was “ready to withdraw from the coalition government of the CPP continued to ignore power-sharing arrangements made after the 1993 elections.[3]

CPP sources, and others, claimed at the time that FUNCINPEC had commenced a “strategy of provocation”. It was stated that the rational behind the FUNCINPEC Congress was to “gain lost political ground by creating a crisis in which [Hun Sen] would make a fetal mistake that would then benefit Prince Ranariddh.”

“The bounds of the expressible”: In the year that followed, Ranariddh continued to aggravate relations with Hun Sen and used his former allies in the 1980s, the Khmer Rouge, to accomplish this. Despite the Khmer Rouge being outlawed, Ranariddh signed an agreement with them that effectively recreated the alliance of the 1980s, ranged against Hun Sen and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, as the State of Cambodia was then known.

The latter (Hun Sen) had been busy with the Khmer Rouge also, in secret talks with one of Pol Pot’s former lieutenant, Ieng Sary. The difference between the two approaches was that while Ranariddh sought alliance with the Khmer Rouge against the CPP, the CPP sought to break up the Khmer Rouge and integrate some of them into the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces.[4]

Hun Sen was not negotiating to create an alliance against a coalition “ally.” His motto in this sense was “unity,” not “fragmentation.” His approach, well documented, was successful and Ieng Sary’s faction came over to the government in 1996 in return for the preservation of Ieng Sary’s semiautonomous fiefdom around the Pailin area of northwestern Cambodia, rich in timber and gems.

Given the increased number of politicians and the need to accommodate them politically in positions of power and authority from which to generate cash remunerations, the solution lay in creating more jobs while at least maintaining the forms of democratic process. In accordance with this, a new political structure was created in the form of bicameralism. Thus, the National Assembly would now be accompanied by the provision of a non-elected Senate.[5]

Internal FUNCINPEC corruption was also an issue, according to the sources involved. A core difference, however, is that Ranariddh has learned the error of his ways and is working to enhance his own advancement as far as possible.





[1] Chumnith’s note: the lack of qualified and dedicated staff is what causes the demise of FUNCINPEC, BLDP, and Sam Rainsy parties.
[2] Chumnith’s note: And Hun Sen understood this very well.
[3] This was an empty threat. This type of political maneuvering shows how much Khmer leaders/politicians lack the insight into the true situation. It is typical and often repeated.
[4] Technically and politically Hun Sen was correct and had outmaneuvered Ranariddh.
[5] The Senators were appointed or rather obtained their seats through the power of dollars.