Cambodia New Deal

NOTE FROM CAMBODIA’S NEW DEAL
A REPORT BY WILLIAM SHAWCROSS 1994


Chapter 1: Cambodia before the Paris accords

Cambodia is a victim of its geography and of its political underdevelopment. Its central drama resembles that of Poland; it is a small country (some 9 million people) overshadowed by two huge and threatening neighbors – 60 millions Thais (Siamese) to the west, and 70 million overcrowded Vietnamese to the east. Like Poland’s, Cambodia’s borders have constantly changed.

During the Angkor Empire from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries, the Khmer kings controlled a large part of what are now northeastern Thailand, southern Laos, and southern Vietnam.

Indeed, the country would have disappeared altogether, divided between Siam and Vietnam, if the French had not arrived and imposed a protectorate upon the moribund Cambodian monarchy in 1864.

Khmer Rouge rule left the country and its people deeply scarred. However, the invasion liberation for almost all Cambodians – soon became an occupation that the Vietnamese insisted was “irreversible.” Hanoi’s motives were strategic rather than humanitarian; it had long nurtured ambitions of dominating an Indochinese federation.

UNTAC
The UN was lamentably slow in deploying UNTAC’s elements and advance planning in New York was fragmented. At the beginning of 1992 fighting between the Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia was already preoccupying the Secretariat. It quickly became evident that the UN was ill-prepared to mount such large peacekeeping operations.

Even the appointment of secretary-general’s Special Representative, Yasushi Akashi, a senior UN diplomat, was delayed. He arrived only in March 1992, along with the Force Commander, Australian Lieutenant General John Sanderson, and the heads of UNTAC’s components, some of whom had been recruited only at the last minute.

The anticipated deployment of the 16,000 multinational troops lagged behind schedule. Sanderson directed that infantry and other line units should arrive with 60 days’ supplies, so they could operate independently until external logistics support arrived. The Civilian Police and Civil Administration of UNTAC did not take similar initiative and, as a result, they arrived even later. Member governments of the UN often proved reluctant to release administrators, arguing that they themselves were short of qualified staff. Akashi later acknowledged that the UN must have seemed very inefficient to the Cambodian factions.

Even after the civilian administrators were finally deployed, UNTAC found itself unable to take control of the five key areas if defense, finance, foreign affairs, information, and public security, as Article 6 of the Paris Agreement demanded.

According to some defectors, the Khmer Rouge leaders were at first prepared to disarm and canton their troops. But by April 1992 they had become increasingly restive. They accused UNTAC of unduly favoring the Hun Sen regime and found excuses for complaint.

On May 30, 1992 the Khmer Rouge used a simple bamboo pole to prevent Akashi and Sanderson from transiting the Khmer Rouge area near Pailin in western Cambodia. Although the flimsy road block was not heavily defended, and the UN had every right to pass it, Akashi and Sanderson decided to make no such attempt.

Sanderson’s then deputy, the French General Michel Loridon, wanted to call the Khmer Rouge’s bluff and send UN troops into their areas at once. But Sanderson believed that such pressure might at once result in wider war.

By the end of 1992 UNTAC had in effect stopped trying to pursue the comprehensive political settlement spelled out in the Paris Agreement. Instead, it attempted merely to create a new Cambodia government with domestic and international legitimacy.

Throughout this period Prince Sihanouk was supposed to chair the Supreme National Council, but he spent large amounts of time out of the country. He visited North Korea, where poor communications kept him almost completely out of touch with Phnom Penh, and Beijing, where several meetings of the Supreme National Council actually had to be held.

At one such meeting on January 1993, Sihanouk demonstrated his management style by castigating a new FUNCINPEC member of the Supreme National Council, Sam Rainsy. The prince mocked him for his alleged political errors and even cast doubt on the state of his marriage. It was reminiscent of Sihanouk’s treatment of his court in the 1960s.

The Khmer Rouge embarked on a highly profitable assault upon the environment. With the help of the Thai Army and private Thai companies, they pillaged the fabulous store of timber and gems under their control. By the end of 1992 they were thought to be making as much as $20 million a month while inflicting appalling environmental damage.

Establishment of the new government
Ranariddh was not alone in viewing Sihanouk’s proposed new government as an attempt by Hun Sen and his hard-line colleague to remain in power behind the fig leaves of Sihanouk and FUNCINPEC. UN officials in Phnom Penh described Sihanouk’s action as an attempt at a constitutional coup and a violation of the Paris Agreement.

Since 1941 Sihanouk had been king, chief of state, prime minister, political leader, musician, cineaste, magazine editor, and exile. He had at times infuriated and horrified his friends and enemies alike. He had been vain, petulant, autocratic, and unpredictable, finding it hard to tolerate dissent and treating Cambodian politicians and foreign statesman as flunkies. He had sometimes made catastrophic errors, misjudging events and his own power to influence them.

Nonetheless, he had also demonstrated an acute intuition for the popular political will and had acted with astuteness, displaying both charm and tenacity. His principal and international ambitions had been to protect Cambodia from further encroachment by its neighbors and to preserve his own political power and place in history.


Chapter 2: The new politics

Cambodian society still needs to be completely overhauled.

The coalition
Ranariddh, his co-prime minister Hun Sen, and other leading members of the coalition sometimes showed more interest in foreign travel or in fripperies than in setting an agenda for the country. Too often FUNCINPEC’s leadership seemed more interested in cosmetic measures than in real changes.

Between $2 million and $4 million were spent on boat races and fireworks for the Independence Day celebration on 9 November 1993. Rannariddh ordered the Phnom Penh port on the river to be moved so that a park could be created. It sometimes appeared that the government was more concerned with décor than with reconstruction and that Rannariddh did not really enjoy facing the difficult decisions needed.

In March 1994 Rannariddh increased such concerns when he left Cambodia for a two-week stay in Aix-en-Provence, resuming his old teaching post. That seemed a strange priority for a new prime minister.

In early December Rannariddh called his new Minister of Information, Ieng Mouly, to ask about a proposed press conference by Hun Sen. Ieng Mouly knew nothing about it; the arrangements had been made exclusively by one of his CPP deputies, who had not bothered to inform the minister. More serious lapses occurred frequently.

FUNCINPEC had a basic problem: lack of its own personnel. Indeed, one must acknowledge that, without its coalition partner, it would have bee quite unable to function at all: the process of governing depended completely on CPP personnel in all the ministries.

Until 1994 FUNCINPEC had been a resistance movement rather than a political party; it had penetrated many branches of the CPP and the SOC (State of Cambodia), but it had not established an organized base in the country.

By early 1994 corruption also threatened to infect, if not destroy, the FUNCINPEC leadership.

Of the three principal political factions, FUNCINPEC is probably the poorest.

In early 1994 all popular expectations rested with FUNCINPEC and to a lesser extent with the BLDP. It was they, not the CPP, who were expected to deliver change. The CPP could afford to sit back – nothing was expected of them. For the Khmer Rouge, time was also a resource.

And yet, Rannariddh, facing a daunting test, had failed to establish a clear sense of direction. Given the extent of Cambodia’s needs in every sector of life, it was undoubtedly a hard task. But it had to be faced – as King Sihanouk frequently pointed out.

The Khmer Rouge and Thailand
The Khmer Rouge were seriously weakened by the election. But they still receive assistance from Thailand and remain a threat to the stability and integrity of the Royal Government.

The defection program could have been given a higher priority by the government. Instead, it has been badly managed and even counterproductive. Monies are scarce. Defectors have been greeted with poor conditions, even with brutality. Reeducation has been harsh; promises have been broken. The overall effect has been to discourage further defections. Some defectors said that while conditions under Khmer Rouge leadership were tough, those in the new Royal Army were often no better. They said that there was more corruption and pay was more erratic.

Foreign Minister Norodom Sirivudh has labeled Thailand “Enemy Number One” and accused it of “scandalous” behavior. In early January he demanded to know whether the Thai government supported the royal government or the Khmer Rouge. “We want a clear stand from Thailand,” he said. Thailand refused to give it.

One problem is Thai commercial activity. While investment is essential, the exploitative rapacity of Thai, or Sino-Thai businessmen, ably abetted by their peers in Malaysia and Singapore, threatens to destroy many Cambodian natural assets.

The uncontrolled ravaging of the land is also having a serious environmental impact. The river Sangke, leading from Pailin into the Great Lake, has been heavily polluted by the erosion caused by the open cast gem mines. It is posing a serious threat to the ecological balance of the northern end of the lake, which is Cambodia’s greatest source of natural wealth: fish.

Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge and Tai military grow richer.

Monarchy
The Cambodian kingship has traditionally been elective rather than heredity. Article 14 of the new constitution restrict the choice. It states that the monarch must be “a member of the Khmer Royal Family, aged at least 30 years, coming from the blood line of the King Ang Duong, Norodom, or Sisowath.”

Parliament
The National assembly is, so far, a disappointment.


Chapter 3: The security dilemma

In Cambodia borders have always been bandits’ and rebels’ wonderland, as the government’s writ has faded the further it stretched from Phnom Penh. Over decades, uncontrollable borders have contributed significantly to the failure of the state. In the 1950s and 1960s the border with Thailand was haven to right-wing opponents of Prince Sihanouk. In the 1960s and 1970s, the borders with Vietnam and Laos were increasingly usurped by the communists. Today, the borders illustrated the corruption eating at every level of Cambodian society.

By April 1994 there were 2,000 generals and 10,000 colonels in the army. It was nothing short of grotesque.

There are many reasons for that. The first is fear of demobilization and its social consequences in a society where there is still no alternative employment. Second, there is no place for the Khmer Rouge. Third, there are fears that reduction might deter Khmer Rouge defections – because their soldiers had been promised positions in the united army if they came across.

The army is still poorly equipped, principally with only old Soviet and Chinese weapons. Apart from five M16 helicopters, it has no aviation. The navy consists of four or five serviceable Stenka patrol boats. The medical corps is poorly trained and has almost no equipment.

By the beginning of 1994, the Cambodian government had not provided donors or potential donors with a coordinated list of priorities and needs. Without some significant external support it will be difficult to maintain even the low level of effectiveness of the forces.

French military advisers reckoned that the ideal size of the army would be about 15,000 in all. Up to 50,000 was thought tolerable. Anything larger would cripple the economy. Political and military reality suggested it would be years before such reductions were achieved.


Chapter 4: The need for rehabilitation and assistance
The new government is essentially broke. The Soviet Union funded most expenditure in the 1980s but with the end of Soviet support in 1990s, the State of Cambodia’s budget went into free-fall.

Despite the progress, the budget situation is still vulnerable to a weak economy and military needs. The revenue system fails to tax entire sectors – including agriculture, which contributes 50 per cent of Cambodia’s gross domestic product (GDP). Until spring 1994 there had also been no taxes on income or consumption. Import duties have made up 60 per cent of government revenue, hardly a sufficient basis for domestic funding programs. Military and civilian service salaries make up 60 per cent of current expenditures, leaving precious little to spend on social welfare programs and, most important to growth, capital expenditures.

As a result of weak enforcement and low customs duties, Cambodia has become something of a regional hub for transit trade in the region, a development it can use to its advantage.

Between 1991 and 1993, Cambodia’s economy grew annually at 7-8 per cent and is now recovering from the slight sag of the uncertain election period a year ago. That high growth, however, was unbalanced and its impact limited. Expansion was largely due to UNTAC’s effect on the service and construction industries, and to the surge in foreign investment catering to UNTAC’s presence. It was centered in Phnom Penh, reaching only 15 per cent of the people.

At least for the present all this is widening the gap in loving standards between the urban and rural populations. Cambodia’s agriculture sector account for more than half of its GDP and employs 80-85 per cent of its labor. Prosperity in Phnom Penh is important but it will not much improve Cambodia’s chances for recovery.

Cambodia has virtually no family planning. On the contrary, the declaration of the Royal Government’s policies issued to the National Assembly at the end of 1993 announced its intention “of increasing the number of Cambodians quickly” because the country “faces neighbors that have seven to eight times more people.” But that racial imperative is likely to be counterproductive; a population that doubles in the next eighteen years (as Cambodia’s will at present rate growth) without massive accompanying investment would impoverish the country. Since no Cambodian government – now or before – has exhibited much interest in the plight of the deprived, farmers and their families flocked to the cities hoping to work or beg.

Currently, the Cambodian civil service employs about 147,000 personnel, or 1.7 per cent of the population – almost double what is usually considered the appropriate proportion for a developing country, let alone for a government that has ceased to perform many of the traditional functions of government. The size reflects in part the command and control economy installed by the Vietnamese but mostly the vast, thinly spread system of patronage through which ordinary Cambodians tapped the state apparatus as social security net.


Epilogue: The problems one year on

Exactly one year after the people made their stunning, good-tempered request for changed and better lives, Cambodia seemed at times to bear a startling resemblance to the early 1970s when corrupt generals of Lon Nol regime sold American-supplied arms to the Khmer Rouge and sent untrained, unpaid boys to fight them. In mid-1994 much the same sort of thing is happening again.

The immediate cause of the disarray was the string of serious military defeats that the government suffered in its attacks upon the Khmer Rouge in Anlong Veng and Pailin.

The stories from the attack on Pailin were indeed terrifying. “Generals” of the Royal Cambodian Army went around spray painting their names on doors of the houses they were each planning to loot, or where they intended to install their mistresses. May of the officers were drunk when a handful of Khmer Rouge counterattacked.

The fighting and destruction have had an appalling affect on confidence amongst both foreign investors and tourists.

One estimate is that the country has lost two years’ development in just a few weeks. And yet even this setback has not seemed to have instilled a sense of urgency in the government or the armed forces. In a brief visit at the end of May, this writer sensed that drift, indecision, and complacency are still the order of the day.

One foreign aid official recalled that a few weeks earlier, the traffic in Phnom Penh at the funeral of General Sak Sutsakhan had stretched around the block. Almost every car seemed to be a Mercedes. And almost everyone appeared to belong to a general. As already mentioned, there are now 2,000 generals in the Cambodian army and 10,000 colonels. Many of these “officers” are not even soldiers; they bought their stripes to be able to intimidate and extort more effectively.

The normal payroll of the entire army has now increased from the 128,000 registered by UNTAC’s Operation Paymaster to close to 160,000 today – eight or ten times the ideal size of the army.

FUNCINPEC’s inability to assume power after the election has induced a state of deadlock, in which the CPP still controls the army, the police, and much of the administration. To many observers the problem is that Rannariddh himself has done little to counter that demobilization by asserting firm leadership or even enunciating any vision for the country.

His critics believe he is happy with the trapping of power and unwilling to fight for the substance. Often Rannariddh seems to have surrendered real power to his co-prime minister, Hun Sen.
Hun Sen seems to some foreign officials in Phnom Penh to be a more serious politician than Ranariddh, but he is still locked into the intrigues, power struggles, and corruption of the CPP. He too has failed to set a defined political agenda for the nation.

Amongst ministries, Finance is still seen as the greatest success by donors. Sam Rainsy’s achievements are significant but the struggle for financial reform is an uphill one. He has managed to stabilize the currency, control inflation, and raise the tax revenues of the government. But he has two problems: He has to constantly fight the CPP’s resistance to change, and it has become clear that he is at odd with Ranariddh, who appears to dislike the praise the international community has given his minister of finance. Ranariddh has openly dismissed him as “our own Zorro” or Robin Hood.”

For his part, Rainsy has made no secrete of his belief that FUNCINPEC has done far too little to stand up to CPP bullying and corrupt practice. Rainsy’s largest problem (and that of the country) is the huge cost of the army. The Minister of Finance has no power to question any of the army’s demand for funds; he has to sign any invoices he is presented. World Bank officials in Washington say that unless this practice is ended soon, and overall military costs are cut back, the economy can never recover.

No restraint on the executive is coming from the National Assembly, which continues to disappoint. Few members of the Assembly ever go to their constituencies; most are more interested in spending their enormous salaries in Phnom Penh or even abroad. Too many of FUNCINPEC’s people are more involved in court intrigues than in national politics. No questions were asked in the Assembly about the military’s defeat in Pailin.

King Sihanouk’s political statements have been no less confusing. After apparently successful treatment for his cancer, the king spent six weeks in the country in April and May sowing confusion amongst different members of government; no one was quite certain what he wanted. He seemed at various times to support military attacks upon the Khmer Rouge, and to wish to see the movement outlawed. At other times, he worked diligently to set up “round table” talks in which the Khmer Rouge would participate. He even invited the Khmer Rouge leader, Khiev Samphan, to sleep at the palace to guarantee his safety in Phnom Penh. Khiev Samphan refused.

The Cambodian government’s principal wounds are self-inflicted, but there are no doubts that other serious blows are being administered by the continuing covert, yet blatant, assistant given by the Thai military officers to the Khmer Rouge.

The underlying truth is that a weak Cambodia has, for many years, been an ambition of Thai foreign policy.

The king perhaps does understand – and ministers from all parties need to – that in the world beyond Cambodia donor fatigue is a very real condition. Many of those most enthusiastic about helping Cambodia have finite resources -- of both patience and money – and there are many other areas of the world that command greater attention, for obvious and often good reasons. Russia and the Middle East are consuming more and more US resources. The people of Rwanda, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Burundi, and many other places are suffering more now than the Cambodians. Cambodian ministers, especially the two prime ministers, must understand that the world does not owe them a living.

If the government does not learn from the lessons of Lon Nol, stamp out corrupt factionalism, and implement genuine reforms, the conditions of ordinary people will not improve and the appeal of the Khmer Rouge will grow.